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Imagine sitting in a grand hall, listen-
ing to the keynote lecture of the confer-
ence you are attending. At some point
your thoughts drift-off. When you look
around you, half of the audience is star-
ing intently at their smartphones. You ask
yourself: what is it about this talk that
makes you unable to stay focused? Do
you find any aspect enjoyable? How would
you behave, if it were you standing at
the podium? Answering questions such as
these, you are engaging in a process known
as introspection.
Introspection describes the ability
to explicitly characterize experience. It
enables one to say: “I am thinking about
what I am thinking about.” In other
words, introspection allows one to become
meta-aware, that is, to have awareness
of what one believes to be experiencing.
Although agreement exists as to the fact
that we all have and make experiences
and therefore subjective experience seems
indisputable (Schooler and Schreiber,
2004; Winkielman and Schooler, 2011),
empirically gaining access to and knowl-
edge of this subjective experience poses
a great challenge. It requires us to put a
subjective, internal experience into words,
such as in the above-mentioned example.
This raises the question, if the words we
come up with are true descriptions of our
experience, or confabulations. Specifically,
the dissociation between experiential con-
sciousness (the contents of experience)
and meta-consciousness (the belief about
the contents of experience) makes us fal-
lible in appraising our own experiences.
In some cases, this fallibility has been
demonstrated to manifest in translational
dissociations, that is, the distortion of
experience in an attempt to recount or
characterize it; this was termed the “intro-
spective error” (Schooler, 2002). Even
though—or perhaps because—the para-
dox of introspection has been studied
extensively for a number of decades, it
is almost paradoxical itself to find that
the resulting implications for the ongoing
debate about (dual-) process types in judg-
ment and decision-making (JDM) and
specifically for the most widely accepted
and experimentally investigated default-
interventionist model (D-I-Model), have
not been considered thus far. In the present
contribution we set out to fill this gap and
point out the implications of the intro-
spective error for the conceptualization of
the D-I-Model.
In the (neuro-) scientific commu-
nity, dual-process models of intuitive
and deliberate JDM currently consti-
tute the preferred theoretical construct
(e.g., Lieberman et al., 2002; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Glöckner and Witteman,
2010; Kahneman, 2011; Evans and
Stanovich, 2013). These models have
been built on the assumption that judg-
ments are formed via two qualitatively
distinct process types: automatic “intu-
ition” and controlled “deliberation” or
“reflection.” In recent years, an immense
influx of publications has arisen, either fer-
vently defending or criticizing the dualistic
distinction between rapid, autonomous,
intuitive processes and slower, thought-
ful, reasoning processes of higher order.
In their most recent publication on
dual-process models, Evans and Stanovich
(2013)—henceforth referred to as E&S—
described their concept as one, which
assumes that automatic processes (Type
1, T1) yield default responses unless an
intervention by higher order reason-
ing processes (Type 2, T2) is needed; a
model, which has been termed the D-I-
Model. We will focus on this current-most
description of dual-process theory, since it
constitutes the predominant model being
intensively discussed by leading authori-
ties in the field1. E&S split the attributes
of both process types into defining (nec-
essary/sufficient) and correlated features.
The defining features listed for T2 pro-
cessing are working memory capacity and
cognitive decoupling. These are seen to
be central in order to be able to reason
hypothetically and distinguish supposi-
tion from belief, thereby aiding “rational
choices by running thought experiments”
(E&S, p. 236). Importantly, cognitive
decoupling requires a re-representation
of automatic (T1) processes so as to be
able to interfere with their output. In that
way T2 processing allows for “metarep-
resentational and simulation abilities,”
and is thus a form of meta-consciousness.
T1 processing, in contrast, is defined as
encompassing both “innately specified
processing modules or procedures and
experiential associations that have been
learned to the point of automaticity”
(E&S, p. 236). Explicitly opposing
1Compare the recent debate in the journal
“Perspectives on Psychological Science,” Volume 8,
2013.
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a general “good-bad thinking idea,” the
D-I-Model assumes T1 processes to lead to
correct answers in benign environments,
i.e., whenever the decision maker can use
overpracticed cues. However, as soon as
conditions for successful T1 processing are
not fulfilled (e.g., novel situations), T2
processing will have to intervene on the
default intuition. E&S argue that due to
peoples’ limited capacity of central cogni-
tive resources, T1 processes inevitably will
be relied on in most situations. The dis-
position to override the default intuition
and to replace it by effective T2 reflec-
tive reasoning is suggested to be a func-
tion of several factors; an important one
being “measurable thinking dispositions
that are inclined toward rational thinking
and disinclined to accept intuitions with-
out checking them out” (p. 237)2. In other
words, cognitive decoupling allowing a
re-representation of automatic T1 pro-
cesses seems to be decisive for intervention
processes to become effective.
Literature on the introspective error,
however, poses a challenge for this dual-
process view insofar as it has been shown
that re-representing subjective experience
can lead to biases and incorrect decisions.
Notably, this counterintuitive finding is
not limited to T1-specific situations, where
overlearned cues elicit the right answer,
but also occurs in situations where the
problem is hard to solve directly from
previous experience or from previously
stored cue validities. We will outline
how the empirical results on introspec-
tion and meta-consciousness, presented
by Schooler and others, are incongruent
with the D-I-type models’ assumption of
reflective processes coming to the rescue
of automatic response and will sketch a
default-disruptive option. Therein, ana-
lytical introspection does not come to
the rescue of intuitive, holistic recogni-
tion but rather disrupts this process, lead-
ing to changes in preference and even




The verbal-overshadowing effect, first
described by Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (1990), reveals a source of
2A feature of human intelligence, as E&S assert.
error in verbally describing a non-verbal
stimulus: When individuals verbally intro-
spect (i.e., attempt to describe in great
detail) about complex non-verbal stimuli
(e.g., recognizing a previously seen face,
or the reasons for choice preferences), dis-
ruption can ensue. Particularly, individ-
uals show markedly worse performance
and make less optimal choices when asked
to verbally introspect. In the words of
Schooler and Schreiber (2004): “Verbal
introspection fails to adequately capture
ineffable experience, breaking them apart
in a manner that makes it difficult to put
back together” (p. 24). Interfering effects
of verbalization have, for example, been
found in a task requiring participants to
watch a short video of a bank robbery
and later attempt to identify the robber
from a photo array. Those participants
who had previously written a detailed
description of the robber’s appearance
were markedly worse on the identifica-
tion task than the control group (Schooler
and Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The engage-
ment of meta-conscious representation
of subjective experience for subsequent
production of a verbal description from
memory actually led to a distortion of wit-
ness’ memory, producing false outcomes.
Schooler and colleagues posit that disso-
ciations and omissions such as these can
occur even when participants simply think
aloud—concurrently or retrospectively—
to the ongoing experiment. The authors
reason that these distortions are due to the
fact that participants are forced to verbally
re-represent inherently non-verbal expe-
riences (Schooler et al., 1993; Lane and
Schooler, 2004; Winkielman and Schooler,
2011). This argument points to the intro-
spective error mentioned above, wherein
meta-consciousness is seen to misrepre-
sent or distort underlying experience. In
other words, the reflective mind lacks
awareness of its own subjective state. This,
however, would on the other hand be
required in order to monitor when an
intervention is necessary, according for
instance to the D-I-Model.
The verbal overshadowing effect is not
limited to visual introspection. Similar evi-
dence comes from studies on preferen-
tial choice. Wilson and Schooler (1991)
compared college students’ preferences
for courses with the ratings of experts.
Students who were asked to introspect, i.e.,
analyzed the reasons why they preferred
some courses over others, or evaluated
attributes of all courses, made choices that
corresponded less with experts’ opinions
than the choices of control subjects.
The two main points in discord with
D-I-type models of dual-processes that are
raised by the verbal overshadowing effect
are as follows:
1. Verbal description of non-verbal mem-
ories induces distorting reflective
processes (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002).
According to D-I-type models, T2 reflec-
tive processes are called upon to inter-
vene on default answers in situations
beyond those relying on innate or con-
ditioned response capacities. Here, the
engagement of T2 processing is assumed
to be more likely to find the (norma-
tively) correct answer. However, evidence
from the study of introspection shows that
performance may be less accurate when
reflective strategies are applied (Dunning
and Stern, 1994). Thereby, intervention
by reflection disrupts performance (e.g.,
face recognition performance) rather than
enhancing it.
2. “Analytic introspective processes
induced by describing memories can
disrupt holistic non-verbal recognition
processes” (Schooler and Schreiber,
2004, p. 25).
In the above-mentioned example of the
eyewitnesses, as we understand it, the
D-I-Modelwould predict the default rise of
a gut reaction (T1) to identify the perpetra-
tor. When overridden by careful reflection
(T2), the correct person should be remem-
bered. Instead, as mentioned above, the
opposite is true. Importantly, this mis-
representation of underlying experience
is not explained by a monitoring failure.
The monitoring failure account describes
the introduction of bias, not from a lack
of appropriate knowledge or cognitive
resources (“mindware”) but a failure to call
on this knowledgewhen itwould beneeded
(De Neys and Bonnefon, 2013). However,
the distortion of underlying experience by
recall and verbalization is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the failure to draw on the
appropriate knowledge. In misrepresent-
ing (subjective) experience, the knowledge
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of the occurrence of experience needs to be
actively calleduponbymeta-consciousness
but the belief about what has been experi-
enced does not alignwithwhatwas actually
experienced. Taken together, these find-
ings lead us to propose an opposing view
to the D-I-Model to describe subjective,
non-verbalizable experiences; this is the
“default-disruptive view.”
THE DEFAULT-DISRUPTIVE VIEW
We propose tasks requiring introspec-
tion about inherently non-verbalizable
processes as examples in which a
default-disruptive option might more
closely represent a mapping of people’s
cognitive processes as opposed to the
current D-I-type models.
Tasks requiring the re-representation of
inherently subjective conscious experience
(what could be seen as being processed
by the “autonomous mind” 3) may elicit
a translational dissociation between
experiential consciousness and meta-
consciousness (“reflective mind”). The
recruitment of T2 processes disrupts
the default response in non-verbalizable
experiences, leading to:
- Distortions of underlying experience
(e.g., verbal overshadowing effect)
- Decline in performance (e.g., speed)
- Decline in accuracy (e.g., recognition)
The introspective error challenges
D-I-type dual-process models precisely
because T1 processes are by their defi-
nition affect-laden decisions, based on
a gut feeling primarily reflecting (non-
verbalizable) experience (Betsch, 2008).
Thus, overriding intuitive responses and
replacing them by T2, reflective reasoning
stringently requires a re-representation of
subjective experience—raising the issues
addressed above.
The challenge of the introspective error
is all the more important since we are
constantly encouraged, by self-help books
and the like, for example, to carefully re-
think (important) decisions in order to
make the right choice. For instance, we can
vividly imagine a police officer encourag-
ing an eyewitness to carefully reconsider
her response, emphasizing the implication
3In keeping with Stanovich’s “Tripartite Model of the
Mind.”
a false statement would have; ironically,
in doing so the police officer will fos-
ter exactly this outcome. Thus, dealing
with the implications of research on the
introspective error is not only relevant for
the conceptualization of D-I-type dual-
process models, but additionally has con-
siderable implications for real-life decision
making.
In summation, the “default-disruptive
view” is a preliminary approximation
to an alternate account of dual-process
models in situations requiring introspec-
tion on internal processes. However, E&S
themselves state that they “view the devel-
opment of dual-process theories as an
evolving project. Just as [dual-process the-
ories] have developed and changed a great
deal in the past decade, we expect this pro-
cess to continue.” (p. 237). In this vein, our
work provides a starting point and a fresh
view for this evolutionary process.
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